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The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders 
 
Sascha G. Walter, Arne Schmidt und Achim Walter 
 
Abstract 
This study explores why academic entrepreneurs patent their inventions before and after 
creating a firm. Drawing on start-up data combined with patent data, we specifically examine 
the impact of five, relatively under-researched factors (scientific field, pace of technological 
development, technological uncertainty, entrepreneurial orientation, and patent effectiveness. 
The  study  shows  that  some  scientific  fields,  technological  uncertainty,  and  patent 
effectiveness are positively related to patent propensity, both before and after founding. The 
effects  of  pace  of  technological  development  and  entrepreneurial  orientation  were  time-
specific. Our study suggests that patenting by academic entrepreneurs is driven by special 
rationales  and  that  prior  research  on  full-time  scientists  and  established  firms  does  not 
necessarily generalize to them. We discuss the implications of our findings both in terms of 
contribution to the current literature and technology transfer policies. 
 
1  Introduction 
Scientists  increasingly  commercialize  their  inventions  through  firm  formation.  The 
decision to patent an invention (or not) can be seen as a critical part of this process. The 
researcher has to weigh up the fundamental tradeoff in patenting: Patents can safeguard the 
knowledge-base  of  a  venture  against  early  imitation  by  defining  property  rights  over  an 
invention  but  at  the  same  time  they  can  facilitate  early  imitation  by  disclosing  critical 
information (Harter, 1994; Arundel, 2001; Kultti, Takalo, & Toikka, 2007). In this situation, a 
researcher who aims to commercially exploit his or her discovery faces two basic options. The 
first is to disclose the discovery to the research organization, let the technology transfer office 
(TTO) file a patent and (hope to) obtain a license prior to firm founding (Thursby & Thursby, 
2002). This involves losing control over the invention. In the worst case scenario, any start-up The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  2 
 
plans can be inhibited because not all research organizations license back to inventors (Shane, 
2002). The other option is to conceal the discovery from the administration and  create  a 
venture without filing a patent prior to founding (Landry, Amara, & Saïhi, 2007; Jensen, 
Thursby, & Thursby, 2003). This poses considerable ethical issues and legal risks (Bercovitz 
& Feldman, 2008). Thus - why and when do academic entrepreneurs patent? 
Scholars have sought explanations for why some researchers patent more than others in 
characteristics of the individual, the research organization, and the firm. Empirical studies on 
individual characteristics have shown that scientists, who are male (Frietsch, Haller, Funken-
Vrohlings, & Grupp, 2009; Whittington & Smith-Doerr, 2005; Thursby & Thursby, 2005), 
older (Allen, Link, & Rosenbaum, 2007; Carayol, 2007; Stephan, Gurmu, Sumell, & Black, 
2007),  conduct  more  applied  research  (Sellenthin,  2009;  Calderini,  Franzoni,  &  Vezzulli, 
2007), have published intensively (Dietz & Bozeman, 2005), and have gained more industry 
experience (D’Este & Perkmann, forthcoming; Meyer, 2006; Renault, 2006) are more likely 
to  patent.  Studies  on  characteristics  of  the  research  organization  have  observed  higher 
patenting rates at institutions that facilitate patenting through active support (Baldini, 2009; 
Sellenthin, 2009; Calderini et al., 2007) and provide clear incentives by splitting revenues 
with inventors (Renault, 2006). Once the firm is founded, characteristics of the firm may also 
influence subsequent patenting behavior. Empirical studies indicate that firms which are large 
(Arora  &  Ceccagnoli,  2006;  Brouwer  &  Kleinknecht,  1999),  export-oriented  (Arundel  & 
Kabla, 1998), intensively conducting R&D (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Scherer, 1983), 
and operating in certain industries (Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999; Arundel & Kabla, 1998; 
Mansfield, 1986) tend to more actively patent their inventions. 
Extant studies on patenting have either considered scientists or established firms but 
have, to date, neglected academic entrepreneurs. Consequently, prior findings might not be 
generalizable to academic entrepreneurs for two reasons. First, they have to weigh up the 
interests of their (prospective) firms and interests of the research organization. Entrepreneurial 
rationales can collide with administrative regulations that stipulate disclosing and patenting 
inventions  with  commercial  potential.  If  a  secrecy  strategy  is  vital  for  the  new  venture’s 
success, some academic entrepreneurs might be motivated to bypass organizational routines. 
Others  might  decide  to  delay  filing  a  patent  until  after  the  firm  is  founded.  Second,  the 
transition  from  the  academic  world  that  emphasizes  open  knowledge  sharing  and  peer The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  3 
 
recognition to the business world that emphasizes private property and profits might change 
the  self-perception  and  strategic  posture  of  academic  entrepreneurs  (Jain,  George,  & 
Maltarich, 2009). As a consequence, his or her preference for protecting intellectual property 
through patents might change. 
This  study  explores  empirically  why  academic  entrepreneurs  patent  and  how  the 
advancement  through  the  founding  process  changes  drivers  of  patenting.  To  illuminate 
changes in patenting tendencies over time, our analysis covers two phases, including a three- 
year-period before and after venture creation, respectively. Specifically, we analyze (inter-
temporal changes in) the effect of the scientific field, pace of technological development, 
technological uncertainty, entrepreneurial orientation, and patent effectiveness on the patent 
propensity of the founding team. A unique dataset of 260 technology start-ups combined with 
patent data, allows us to test our hypotheses in a context in which patenting is a critical 
strategic decision and substantial patentable know-how is involved.  
This  paper  makes  three  contributions  to  the  extant  literature.  First,  it  provides  an 
empirical test of the impact of several influences on the patent propensity of a special group - 
academic  entrepreneurs.  Such  a  test  bridges  the  divide  between  two  literatures  that  have 
evolved in relative isolation and have either looked at scientists or incumbent firms. Second, 
the study shows that the pace of technological development, technological uncertainty, and 
entrepreneurial orientation, affect patent decisions. In doing so, it extents prior research that 
has paid little attention to these factors. Third, the study spans both the pre-founding and the 
post-founding phase, which facilitates detecting potential dynamics in the strength of these 
influences. The results complement prior research by showing that such changes are minimal. 
The paper is divided into five sections. In the next section, we review the extant literature and 
explain  why  the  five  influences  should  affect  the  likelihood  that  academic  entrepreneurs 
patent their inventions. In the third section, we describe the dataset and methods used in this 
study. In the fourth section, we present the results and discuss their implications in the last 
section. 
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2  The different explanations 
The  extant  literature  on  patenting  has  focused  on  full-time  scientists  or  established 
firms.  Academic  entrepreneurs,  in  part,  stand  between  both  streams  because  they  are 
entrepreneurially-minded  scientists  who  create  new  firms  to  commercialize  their  research. 
Prior  findings  might,  therefore,  not  generalize  to  them.  As  firm  formation  involves  the 
challenge of converting an elementary idea to a profitable venture, other rationales may drive 
the patenting of academic entrepreneurs. The rationales could also change over time. Thus, 
analyzing patenting behavior throughout the founding process might yield new insights. Case-
based research by Vohora et al. (2004) proposes five phases of start-up development. Drawing 
on this framework, we suggest that different drivers of patenting may prevail in the phases. 
In the first phase, scientific research within academic institutions creates entrepreneurial 
opportunities.  Many  universities  have  adopted  “pro-patent  policies”  to  foster  patenting  of 
their  employees’  inventions  (Baldini,  2009).  Moreover,  academics  increasingly  seem  to 
accept  patenting  as  a  legitimate  activity  that  is  compatible  with  other  career  interests 
(Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008). Thus, scientists in fields with patentable research should be 
more likely to file patents. In the second phase, the entrepreneurs and/or the TTO examine if 
the opportunity has sufficient commercial value to warrant further effort to exploit it. In fields 
with a high pace of technological development, patents can, in part, shield the start-up against 
uprising competition, thereby helping to secure value from the invention (Hall & Ziedonis, 
2001).  Moreover,  in  situations  of  high  technological  uncertainty,  effective  patents  often 
provide  the  time  required  to  develop  marketable  applications  from  the  core  technology 
(Shane, 2004). In the subsequent phases, the venture acquires and deploys strategic resources, 
continuously optimizes its approach to identify, acquire and integrate requisite resources and 
finally attains sustainable returns. These phases are characterized by a steep learning curve 
leading the entrepreneurs to think and act more strategically. To the extent they adopt a more 
strategic  posture,  a  growing  entrepreneurial  orientation  may  replace  a  previously  more 
academic rationale in patenting. Moreover, the effectiveness of patent protection plays a key 
role throughout all phases (Shane, 2002). 
Interviews with entrepreneurs and technology transfer officers also suggest that the five 
factors  –  scientific  field,  pace  of  technological  development,  technological  uncertainty, The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  5 
 
entrepreneurial orientation, and patent effectiveness – can drive patenting by members of the 
founding team. The subsections below provide more detailed arguments for why this should 
be the case. To explore changes over time, we consider both the pre- and post-founding phase. 
 
2.1  Scientific field 
We  first  consider  the  scientific  field  of  the  founding  team  members.  Patenting  can 
collide with traditional academic norms (Etzkowitz, 1998), involve the risk of receiving no 
(exclusive)  license  (Shane,  2002),  or  may  be  a  suboptimal  strategy  for  some  start-ups 
(Arundel,  2001).  This  might  lead  some  inventors  not  to  patent.  However,  we  argue  that 
academic entrepreneurs from scientific fields that typically yield patentable results are more 
likely to patent for several reasons. First, for federally funded research, invention disclosure is 
stipulated by law and encouraged by many research organizations. Thus, academics patent to 
be eligible for future government grants and to comply with legal requirements. Royalty-
sharing incentives, active support through technology transfer offices (TTO), and negligible 
costs also encourage inventors to patent (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008).  
Second, patents reflect research performance, thus academics engage in patenting to 
demonstrate  their  per  se  unobservable  quality  as  a  researcher.  Scientists  in  a  study  by 
Göktepe-Hulten  and  Mahagaonkar  (forthcoming),  for  instance,  patented  not  primarily  for 
immediate financial gains but to signal their achievement and to gain reputation in academia 
and  industry.  Such  quality  signals  are  central  to  the  academic  career  system  as  they  are 
directly linked to financial rewards, tenure, and promotions. While publishing is still regarded 
as the major mechanism for gaining scientific reputation and publication rates far exceed 
patent rates (Dietz & Bozeman, 2005), publishing and patenting provide different signals. A 
publication  in  a  prestigious  journal  shows  that  the  underlying  research  is  novel  to  the 
scientific community and has substantial intellectual value, whereas a patent indicates that the 
research is novel to the industrial community and has potential commercial value. Empirical 
studies  suggest  that  both  are  complementary  rather  than  substitute  activities  for  faculty 
members (Meyer, 2006; Van Looy, Callaert, & Debackere, 2006; Thursby & Thursby, 2005; 
Agrawal & Henderson, 2002) and that in many cases the same research can yield patents as 
well as publications (Jensen & Murray, 2005). Consequently, academics can draw on both 
strategies to position themselves on the market for academic positions. Because increased The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  6 
 
technology  transfer  has  become  an  articulated  objective  of  the  university  administration 
(Etzkowitz,  1998),  more  directly  applicable  research  may  be  desired.  Patenting  permits 
researchers to signal that they are capable of conducting such research. 
Third, patents spur relationships with industry that provide access to critical resources. 
For  scientists  without  venturing  intentions,  they  serve  as  “chips  to  exchange”  for 
supplementary funding, access to equipment, and insights applicable for academic research 
(Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001; Meyer-Krahmer & Schmoch, 1998).  
If, as we argue above, academic entrepreneurs have a general motivation to patent, the 
patentability of their inventions should be the major restriction. However, some scientific 
fields, such as business or law, are not conducive to yielding patentable results. In contrast, 
other  fields,  such  as  natural  science,  medicine,  engineering,  and  computer  science,  have 
higher patenting potential (Azagra-Caro, Carayol, & Llerena, 2006; Dietz & Bozeman, 2005). 
Founding teams composed of scientists from these fields should exhibit higher patenting rates 
than  others.  This  rationale  should  prevail  after  founding  because  many  academic 
entrepreneurs  retain  their  self-view  as  researchers  while  engaging  in  commercialization 
activities (Jain et al., 2009). This explanation suggests that, ceteris paribus,  
 
Hypothesis  1.  The  higher  the  number  of  founders  from  scientific  fields  with  patenting 
potential, the more likely is the founding team to file patents prior to and after firm founding.  
 
2.2  Pace of technological development 
The second influence we consider is the pace of technological development that refers 
to the speed of technological changes in a technological field (sometimes also referred to as 
technological turbulence, e.g., Jaworski & Kohli, 1993). Scholars of technology evolution 
have argued that new technologies are often born in federally funded research organizations. 
With ongoing basic research, more researchers and firms become interested in the technology 
and refine it (Pavitt, 1984; Walsh, 1984). The pace of technological development grows and 
firms increasingly enter markets with products and services based on the technology. In the 
next phase, the technology matures, markets become saturated, and the entry rate declines- the 
pace of technological development drops again (Dosi, 1982; Gort & Klepper, 1982). The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  7 
 
The pace of technological development should enhance the likelihood that academic 
entrepreneurs  file  patents  for  three  reasons.  First,  TTOs  tend  to  encourage  patenting  in 
rapidly-developing fields because the activity in the field indicates the potential value of an 
invention – a key criterion to patent. Firms in the field prove that marketable applications of 
the technology exist. They also serve as potential licensees, thereby increasing the prospect of 
generating revenues. Second, in times of rapid technological advances, niche markets emerge 
and offer a fertile ground for market entry by new firms (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). As 
industry rivalry increases and more competitors begin to work on the same technology, the 
threat of knowledge leakages and appropriation grows. New firms are therefore required to 
protect their core technology against imitation and secure their niche market through strong 
proprietary  rights  to  key  technologies  (Hall  &  Ziedonis,  2001;  Blind,  Edler,  Frietsch,  & 
Schmoch, 2006). Third, in this situation, new firms are also increasingly competing with other 
newcomers  for  external  funding  and  market  shares.  Thus,  signaling  technological  quality 
through patents becomes more important to attract potential investors and customers (Levitas 
& McFadyen, 2009). Patents support the acquisition of external funding when the academic 
entrepreneurs have no other evidence of the commercial value of their invention (Hall, 2005). 
Consequently, ceteris paribus, 
 
Hypothesis  2.  The  higher  the  pace  of  technological  development,  the  more  likely  is  the 
founding team to file patents prior to and after firm founding. 
 
2.3  Technological uncertainty 
The third influence, technological uncertainty, refers to the perceived degree to which 
the process of developing marketable products from the core technology is predictable and 
controllable. If technological uncertainty is high, the time, costs, and supportive technologies 
necessary to develop products cannot be foreseen. Often academic start-ups commercializing 
radical technologies are confronted with uncertainty and barriers that must be overcome to 
successfully  introduce  the  technology  to  market  (Bhide,  1994).  Technological  uncertainty 
should increase the likelihood that academic entrepreneurs file patents for three reasons. First, 
in many technology fields one firm alone cannot handle the research involved in developing The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  8 
 
marketable products, but requires research partners from academia or industry. This poses 
considerable risks of knowledge-leakages. Patents are conducive to finding research partners 
and  successfully  collaborating  in  R&D  as  they  establish  clear  proprietary  rights  over  the 
shared knowledge (Hertzfeld, Link, & Vonortas, 2006; Arundel, 2001). Second, alternative IP 
protection strategies like secrecy or a time lead on competitors assume that firms quickly 
develop and market products to realize first-mover-advantages. In situations, where the time 
to yield marketable products and the number of resulting products is hardly predictable, such 
strategies appear to be less applicable. Patent protection allows academic entrepreneurs to 
experiment with different alternative designs of commercial applications for a technology and 
adopt  it  to  market  needs  before  competition  sets  in  (Shane,  2001).  Third,  technological 
uncertainty  lengthens  time-to-market  and  increases  the  likelihood  that  the  academic 
entrepreneurs  do  not  discover  marketable  applications  of  the  technology.  Patents  allow 
securing some minimum value from the technology even if product development fails. The 
arguments above suggest that, ceteris paribus,  
 
Hypothesis 3. The higher the technological uncertainty, the more likely is the founding team 
to file patents prior to and after firm founding. 
 
2.4  Patent effectiveness 
The fourth critical influence examined in this study is patent effectiveness, this is the 
degree to which they protect against imitation and facilitate enforcing legal rights in the case 
of infringements. Patenting involves considerable risks because it requires the disclosure of 
critical information on an invention, thereby allowing competitors to learn about promising 
research areas or ways to patent around an invention (Arundel, 2001). Mazzoleni and Nelson 
(1998) state that “patents encourage and provide a vehicle for disclosure and, more generally, 
generate quick and wide diffusion of the technical information underlying new inventions”. 
Moreover,  the  potential  of  patents  to  secure  economic  value  was  found  to  vary  across 
technological  fields  and  industries  (Arundel  &  Kabla,  1998;  Schankerman,  1998).  The 
decision to patent may therefore rest on the strength of patent protection relative to the risks 
involved. If patents are strong, imitation risks are reduced and patenting activities are more The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  9 
 
actively pursued. This allows them to realize the advantages of patents, such as signaling 
towards  customers  and  investors  or  giving  time  for  product  development  (Shane,  2001). 
Conversely, if patents are weak, firms tend to rely on other strategies to protect their IP, such 
as secrecy or a time lead on competitors. 
Empirical studies suggest the effectiveness of patents as one explanation for industry 
differences  in  patenting  rates  (Arundel  &  Kabla,  1998;  Schankerman,  1998;  Brouwer  & 
Kleinknecht, 1999). Hall and Ziedonis (2001) found that the strengthening of the US patent 
rights in the 80s triggered an upsurge in patenting in the semiconductor industry. Arora and 
Ceccagnoli  (2006)  found  a  positive  relationship  between  patent  effectiveness  and  patent 
propensity of firms. According to other studies, patenting rates are higher in countries with 
strong patent systems characterized by effective enforcement mechanisms and few restrictions 
on patent rights (de Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2009; van Zeebroeck, van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, & Guellec, 2009). 
As the technology is usually applicable for distinct possible applications in different 
industries (e.g. Gans & Stern, 2003; Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2008), we expect the 
patent  effectiveness  in  the  technological  field  of  the  idea  the  start-up  is  based  upon  to 
influence the propensity to patent prior firm founding. After firm founding, we expect the 
patent  effectiveness  of  the  industries  the  start-up  has  consequently  entered  to  influence 
patenting behavior. Thus we posit that, ceteris paribus,  
 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the patent effectiveness in a technological field (industry), the more 
likely is the founding team to file patents prior to and after firm founding. 
 
2.5  Entrepreneurial orientation 
The fifth explanation for variation in the patent propensity of academic entrepreneurs is 
entrepreneurial orientation - this is the processes, structures, and behaviors of firms that are 
characterized by innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Miller 
& Friesen, 1983). Innovativeness reflects the tendency of a firm to actively support new ideas, 
novelty, experimentation, and creative solutions in pursuit of competitive advantage. Risk-
taking involves a firm’s tendency to take business-related chances regarding strategic actions The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  10 
 
in uncertain environments. Proactiveness is a firm’s tendency to anticipate and act on future 
needs by introducing new products and services ahead of the competition (Covin & Slevin, 
1989; Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). While a broad stream of research has linked entrepreneurial 
orientation to business performance (Rauch, Wiklund, Lumpkin, & Frese, 2009), it should 
also increase the patent propensity of academic entrepreneurs after firm founding. 
Entrepreneurial-oriented firms tend to compete on the basis of their technological skills 
in the belief that successful innovation emanates from effective R&D (Atuahene-Gima & Ko, 
2001). They strive for a technology leadership rather than a follower strategy (Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996), which drives them to dedicate a higher share of their expenses to R&D than 
other firms (Renko, Carsrud, & Brännback, 2009). Because of their focus on an exploratory, 
risk-seeking approach to innovation, such firms are likely to be the first to arrive at new 
inventions that can be protected by patents. Moreover, patent protection creates favorable 
conditions  to  experiment  with  new  technologies  in  a  pursuit  for  more  creative  product 
applications  (Shane,  2001).  Firms  with  well-protected  technological  bases  can  therefore 
follow a more aggressive growth strategy with a lower risk of knowledge leakages. Patents 
help to “stake claims” in the market and defend a “pole position” in a possible technology 
race that many start-ups have at the outset. Finally, entrepreneurial-oriented firms were found 
to  increase  their  innovation  capacity  by  forming  effective  alliances  (Marino,  Strandholm, 
Steensma, & Weaver, 2002). Patents are a signaling device to attract potential partners and 
prepare a successful collaboration (Hertzfeld et al., 2006; Arundel, 2001). These arguments 
propose that, ceteris paribus,
1 
 
Hypothesis 5. The higher the  entrepreneurial orientation, the more likely  is the founding 
team’s start-up to file patents after firm formation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
1 The extant literature has defined entrepreneurial orientation on the group- or firm-level. Consequently, we 
restrict Hypothesis 5 to the post-founding phase. The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  11 
 
3  Methods 
3.1  Sample and procedure 
This study examines a combination of survey and patent data. We surveyed start-ups 
created  to  exploit  technology  from  publicly  funded  research  institutions  in  Germany, 
including  universities,  universities  of  applied  science,  and  research  institutions  within  the 
Fraunhofer Society, Helmholtz Association, Leibniz Science Association, and Max-Planck 
Society (see Krabel und Müller, 2009 for a description). After gathering contact information 
from technology transfer offices, print media, the internet and annual reports from research 
institutions,  we  contacted  542  start-ups  via  phone  to  arrange  interview  appointments.  To 
include only firms with the potential to patent, we confirmed that the underlying business 
model was based on a  technological invention developed by the founders in the research 
organization.  Trained  interviewers  then  conducted  288  face-to-face  interviews  with  one 
member  of  the  founding  teams.  Data  on  patent  effectiveness  was  collected  from  patent 
attorneys in Germany. We sent a standardized questionnaire to 2,417 individuals listed in the 
directory of German patent attorneys. Of those, 190 usable questionnaires were returned (8%). 
On average, the respondents had worked for 9.59 years (s.d. 8.82) as patent attorney and for 
14.87 years (s.d. 10.33) in patent-related fields. 
Patent data came from the database “PATSTAT” (version 09/2008) provided by the 
European Patent Office. We considered patent applications by members of the founding team 
in the pre-founding phase (three full years prior to incorporation) and patent applications by 
the start-up itself in the post-founding phase (three full years after incorporation). The final 
dataset  consisted  of  260  start-ups,  of  which  120  (60)  had  filed  patents  prior  (after) 
incorporation.  Technological  fields  included  software/simulation  (33%),  biotechnology 
(23%),  electronics  (22%),  nanotechnology/new  materials  (10%),  and  others  (12%).  The 
average venture had been in business for five years (mean = 4.93; s.d. = 2.34), had three 
founders  (mean  =  3.27;  s.d.  =  1.90),  and  employed  eleven  full-time  equivalents  (mean  = 
11.29; s.d. = 12.61). This sample profile is comparable to related studies in the field (Nerkar 
& Shane, 2003; Hmieleski & Baron, 2009). 
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3.2  Measures 
3.2.1  Dependent variables 
Patent propensity refers to the tendency of an individual or a group to file patents for 
inventions. In line with the extant literature (e.g., Brouwer & Kleinknecht, 1999), we adopted 
two alternative measures for the pre- and post-founding phase. The first is a dummy variable 
for the mere existence of patent applications by the founding team or start-up (0 = no patents 
filed, 1 = patents filed). It reflects the founding team’s willingness to use patents at all. The 
second  is  the  number  of  patent  family  applications.  A  patent  family  comprises  all  patent 
applications  based  on  the  same  invention  in  different  jurisdictions.
2  Grouping  patent 
applications into families avoids redundant counts by considering the same invention only 
once in our data (Lettl, Rost, & von Wartburg, 2009). This measure captures the extent to 
which  the  founding  team  opts  for  patents.  As  it  substantially  deviates  from  normal 
distribution, we used a natural log transformation. 
 
3.2.2  Independent variables 
Information on the scientific field was gathered by asking for the type and field of the 
highest degree of all founding team members. We considered four fields in our analysis that 
typically  yield  patentable  research  outcomes  (natural  science,  engineering,  medicine,  and 
computer science). The pace of technological development in a start-up’s technological field 
was - like all other items, unless stated otherwise - measured on a 7-point Likert-scale (1 = 
“does  not  apply  at  all”;  7  =  “applies  fully  and  completely”).  We  derived  our  four  item 
measure  based  on  Sood  and  Tellis  (2005).  The  scale  describes  the  extent  of  research 
conducted in a specific technological field and the frequency of technological change. One 
item of the original scale was deleted during scale purification. The measure is reliable at an 
alpha of 0.78. An overview of all items and validity information is presented in the Appendix 
A.  We  developed  a  scale  for  technological  uncertainty  through  a  procedure  proposed  by 
                                                                                                                                                         
2 To be considered as part of the same DocDB simple family, a patent application has to claim exactly the same 
priority applications. There may be exceptions from this rule if the European Patent Office classifies a patent 
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Rossiter (2002), as no directly applicable established measure was available. This resulted in 
three reflective items conceptually based on the work of Bhide (1994) and Shane (2004: 186-
190). The measure is reliable at an alpha of 0.77. 
To  measure  patent  effectiveness,  patent  attorneys  rated  the  degree  to  which  patents 
reliably protect against imitation and grant enforceable rights in several technological fields 
and  industries  (7-point  Likert-scale;  1  =  “very  low  effectiveness”,  7  =  “very  high 
effectiveness”). For technological fields, descriptive statistics (presented in Appendix B) and 
results from a factor analysis indicated the presence of two groups with low and high value, 
respectively. Since considering all fields in the regression analyses posed multicollinearity 
problems, we decided to use a dummy instead. Start-ups in the field of software & simulation 
(mean  3.73,  s.d.  1.55)  and  production  &  management  techniques  (mean  3.63,  s.d.  1.57) 
received a value of 0 for low effectiveness, whereas start-ups in the remaining fields received 
a value of 1 for high effectiveness. While the start-ups in our sample were only active in one 
technological  field,  they  sometimes  operated  in  more  than  one  industry.  In  this  case,  the 
average rating was chosen. In extending prior operationalizations (e.g. Arora & Ceccagnoli, 
2006),  our  measure  prevents  the  threat  of  a  common  method  bias  by  surveying  patent 
attorneys rather than firms directly. 
To  operationalize  dimensions  of  entrepreneurial  orientation,  we  derived  our  own 
measures based on the established Covin and Slevin (1989) scale. To acknowledge the special 
situation of start-ups, we adjusted some items of the original scale that referred to established 
firms to the context of new firms. For, instance, the item “[my firm] typically initiates actions 
which competitors then respond to” was replaced by the item “our company undertakes great 
efforts to find new applications for our core technologies and to open new markets for our 
existing  products/services.”  As  the  dimensionality  of  the  construct  is  an  area  of  ongoing 
debate (Rauch et al., 2009), we decided to factor-analyze the items to confirm the original 
three-factor solution. After dropping items with a factor loading of a less then 0.40, the three 
dimensions  innovativeness  (2  items),  proactiveness  (3  items),  and  risk-taking  (2  items) 
emerged, with alpha levels of 0.75, 0.64, and 0.70, respectively. The sum of these dimensions 
forms the final measure for entrepreneurial orientation. 
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3.2.3  Control variables 
To isolate the effect of our predictor variables, we inserted several control variables that 
might affect patent propensity. Recent legislative changes, such as the Bayh-Dole Act from 
1980 in the US, entitle research organizations to commercialize their employee’s inventions, 
providing direct incentives to promote patenting. The German equivalent is the Employee’s 
Inventions  Act  (EIA,  Arbeitnehmererfindungsgesetz;  see  Harhoff  &  Hoisl,  2007  for  an 
outline). A dummy variable coded 1 if the start-up was founded after 2001 and 0 for those 
founded before, controls for the impact of the act. Two research societies, Fraunhofer Society 
and Max-Planck Society, have established centralized patenting offices for all, geographically 
dispersed  member  organizations.  Such  centralization  facilitates  patenting  if  it  leads  to 
economies of scale, accelerates the process, and increases the quality  of services offered. 
Alternatively,  it  discourages  patenting  if  the  geographic  distance  constrains  the  patenting 
process  and  complicates  motivating  inventors  to  patent.  We  therefore  controlled  for 
centralized support with a dummy variable that is coded 1 if the mother organization of the 
firm had a centralized patenting office and 0 for those that do not. 
As larger start-up teams possess more resources to develop patentable inventions, we 
controlled for team size in terms of the number of founders in the pre-founding phase and the 
number of R&D employees in the post-founding phase. Start-up experience is likely to shape 
the tendency to patent because it permits academics to test the efficacy of patents and the 
entrepreneurial role. We therefore included a dummy variable that was coded 1, if at least one 
member of the founding team had previously started a company and 0 if no member had. 
Market potential refers to the extent to which marketable applications can be drawn from a 
core technology. Inventions with higher commercial value are more likely to result in patents 
(Bercovitz & Feldman, 2008). Market potential was measured with two reflective items and is 
reliable  at  an  alpha  of  0.76.  Expert  knowledge  describes  the  extent  to  which  the  core 
technology  of  the  start-up  was  based  on  tacit  knowledge  of  the  founding  team.  Such 
knowledge is often seen as a prerequisite for pursuing a secrecy strategy, as an important 
alternative to patenting (Arundel, 2001). The three-item measure was reliable at an alpha of 
0.71. Patents are conducive to venture capital investments as they secure value of the firm and 
signal technological quality (Wright, Lockett, Clarysse, & Binks, 2006). The same rationale 
might drive venture capitalists on the board of new ventures to encourage patenting. Thus, we The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  15 
 
inserted a dummy variable coded 1 if one or more venture capitalists held a stake in the start-
up’s equity and 0 if no one had. 
 
4  Results 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. Table 2 displays the 
regression  results.  Calculations  of  the  variance  inflation  factor  (VIF)  reveal  no  serious 
multicollinearity problems (VIF < 2.05).
3 Diagnostic checking confirms that the assumptions 
of regression analysis are met. 
 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Table 1 and 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------- 
 
Hypothesis 1 suggests a positive relationship between the number of  founders from 
scientific  fields  with  patenting  potential  and  patent  propensity.  The  models  indicate  that 
founding teams with a higher number of researchers from natural science and medicine are 
more likely to patent than those teams with many scientists from engineering and software & 
simulation. This result provides some support for Hypothesis 1. According to Hypothesis 2, 
patent propensity increases with the pace of technological development. Our findings differ 
across time: In the pre-founding phase, a significant impact on the number of patents (β = .11, 
p < .05) and a weakly significant impact on the existence of patents was found (Exp(B) = 
1.21, p < .10). In the post-founding phase, the effects were not significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2 
received some support.  
As stated in Hypothesis 3, we expected that a higher technological uncertainty would 
result in a higher patent propensity. This is consistently confirmed across all models, lending 
                                                                                                                                                         
3 Logistic regression does not include collinearity statistics. We therefore relied on VIF statistics provided by 
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strong support for Hypothesis 3. We stipulated a positive impact of patent effectiveness on 
patent propensity in Hypothesis 4. Consistent with our expectations, the patent effectiveness 
in the technological field was positively related to both the existence of patents (Exp(B) = 
5.54, p < .001) and the number of patent family applications (β = .36, p < .001). The results 
for patent effectiveness in the industry were similar (Exp(B) = 1.70, p < .01; β = .12, p < .05, 
respectively). Hypothesis 4 therefore received strong support. For the post-founding phase, 
Hypothesis 5 predicts a positive impact of entrepreneurial orientation on patent propensity. 
The  proposed  relationship  was  positive  and  significant  for  the  number  of  patent  family 
applications  (β  =  .14,  p  <  .05),  but  only  weakly  significant  for  the  existence  of  patents 
(Exp(B) = 1.11, p < .10). This lends some support to Hypothesis 5. 
With regard to our control variables, EIA was negatively related to patent propensity 
(Exp(B) = -.94, p < .01; β = -.23, p < .001), suggesting a decline in patenting in the aftermath 
of  the  act.  In  the  post-founding  models,  the  number  of  patent  family  applications  was 
significantly related to start-up experience (β = -.13, p < .05), market potential (β = .12, p < 
.05), and venture capital (β = .19, p < .001). Moreover, we performed several test for all 
models to check the robustness of our findings. First, we redid the analyses restricting the pre-
founding and post-founding phase to two years before and after incorporation. The results 
showed no substantial differences regarding the main findings. Second, we added a variable 
for the share of inventors who left academia to work full-time for the start-up. The variable 
reflects the extent to which members of the founding focus on academic or business careers. 
As  the  pattern  of  our  results  did  not  change  substantially,  but  model  fit  decreased,  we 
removed the variable again. 
 
5  Discussion 
This article examined five influences on the patent propensity of academic founding 
teams before and after incorporation- the scientific field, technological uncertainty, pace of 
technological  development,  patent  effectiveness,  and  (only  after  firm  founding) 
entrepreneurial  orientation.  Using  data  from  260  technology-based  start-ups  in  Germany 
combined with patent information from the PATSTAT database, we find that these influences The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  17 
 
are positively  related to the tendency to file patents. Controlling for various confounding 
influences, academics were more likely to patent when the search for marketable applications 
of  the  firm’s  core  technology  was  highly  uncertain,  the  technological  field  was  rapidly 
changing, the founding team operated in fields with strong patent protection, and the start-up 
was high in entrepreneurial orientation. Moreover, the pattern of results did not substantially 
differ between the pre-founding and the post-founding phase. Thus, the same influences seem 
to drive patenting before and after incorporation. One exception is the pace of technological 
development which is significant only in the pre-founding phase. 
 
5.1  Limitations 
This study is not without limitations. First, it illuminates a relatively short time period 
of three years before and after incorporation to detect changes in the rationale for patenting. 
Although in this phase the ground for the future of the start-up may be laid, we have little 
insight into how patenting behavior develops after that. Future research is therefore necessary 
to  advance  our  knowledge  of  how  and  whether  the  patent  propensity  of  academic 
entrepreneurs changes and affects patent policies of their growing start-ups. 
Second, sampling solely from research organizations in Germany may yield results that 
are  mostly  generalizable  to  this  context.  Country  differences,  such  as  variations  in 
jurisdiction,  university  regulations,  or  the  routines  of  technology  transfer,  might  generate 
different conditions for patenting, and may therefore affect patent propensity. While we have 
no a priori reason to believe that the findings would fail to apply to other country settings, the 
empirical investigation addressed only one setting. Consequently, the generalizability of our 
results to other country settings is questionable until future research proves otherwise. 
Third,  our  study  does  only  examine  patent  applications  without  considering  other 
characteristics  of  patents.  Thus,  we  have  no  information  on  which  patents  are  actually 
granted.  Similar  data  limitations  precluded  controlling  for  the  economic  value  of  patents. 
Future research could draw on such data to investigate to what extent patenting is driven by 
economic or other rationales.  
Fourth, our dataset contains no information on which of the patents filed in the pre-
founding  phase  were  actually  licensed-back  and  used  by  the  start-up.  Although  our  pre-The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  18 
 
founding models address patenting by the founders in general, not only for the purpose of 
starting a business, such information could help to disentangle patents filed to create licensing 
revenues from patents filed to prepare venturing activities. However, our interviews with the 
founders indicate that the majority of patents filed within three years prior to incorporation 
were actually used by the new venture. 
 
5.2  Implications for research 
The results of this study have useful implications for different research areas. Many 
scholars have observed that academic researchers do not solely patent for monetary, but also 
for non-monetary reasons, e.g. to establish industry relationships or to gain prestige within the 
scientific  community.  This  partly  explains  why  many  researchers  file  patents  in  areas  in 
which patents typically possess less economic value as the underlying inventions are often 
incremental  improvements  of  existing  technologies  or  products  (Owen-Smith  &  Powell, 
2001;  Dietz  &  Bozeman,  2005).  However,  our  study  provides  no  conclusive  results  for 
academic entrepreneurs. Future research should therefore examine whether they are driven by 
more academic or more entrepreneurial rationales when patenting. At least our finding for the 
negative impact of founding experience indicates that prior exposure to the business world 
might change their patenting behavior. 
In addition, academic entrepreneurs are more likely to patent their inventions prior to 
founding  if  the  pace  of  technological  development  is  high,  enabling  them  to  protect 
prospective niches and to obtain venture capital. This finding extends the work by scholars of 
technological change who have established a link between technology life cycles and firm 
formation rates (Shane, 2001) by demonstrating that the development phase of a technology 
also influences the decision to patent. Contrary to our predictions, the relationship between 
the pace of technological development and patenting was not significant in the post-founding 
phase. One possible explanation for the unexpected finding is that the  founders construct 
patent  fences  to  prepare  the  market  entry.  After  incorporation  they  focus  on  commercial 
activities, while further R&D activities resulting in patentable inventions are neglected within 
the time scope of our study.  The Patenting Behavior of Academic Founders  19 
 
The results also indicate that in situations of high technological uncertainty when the 
time and resources required to develop marketable applications from the core technology are 
hardly predictable, academic entrepreneurs are more likely to file patents. In prior studies, 
incumbent  firms  were  found  to  prefer  alternative  protection  strategies,  such  as  lead  time 
advantage (Blind et al., 2006) or secrecy (Arundel, 2001), to patent protection. In contrast, our 
findings  suggest  that  such  strategies  are  less  applicable  for  new  firms  facing  high 
technological uncertainty as they must swiftly develop and market products, but these firms 
cannot forecast the development time.  
In Addition, our study adds to the literature on entrepreneurial orientation. Strategic 
management scholars have linked the construct to business performance (Rauch et al., 2009), 
but more recent studies failed to show its impact on firms’ product innovativeness (Renko et 
al.,  2009).  As  our  findings  indicate  the  context  of  technology  start-ups,  entrepreneurial 
orientation is positively related to the tendency to patent. Consequently, founding teams high 
in entrepreneurial orientation seem to focus on inventions with higher patenting potential or 
patent more aggressively to secure a strong position in the technological field or market.  
The  result  that  patent  effectiveness  drives  patenting  by  academic  entrepreneurs 
demonstrates  the  importance  of  strong  intellectual  property  protection  in  commercializing 
academic inventions. Entrepreneurship research has already shown that a broad patent scope 
increases new firm value (Lerner, 1994) and the probability of licensing to non-inventors 
(Shane, 2002). However, university inventors were found to also patent in fields with weak 
patent protection, when pursuing academic interests (Owen-Smith & Powell, 2001; Dietz & 
Bozeman, 2005). While academic entrepreneurs have to balance academic and entrepreneurial 
career requirements, this study provides evidence that their patenting decision is driven by an 
economic rationale of patent effectiveness. 
Finally, the study shows that three influences – scientific field with patenting potential, 
technological uncertainty, and patent effectiveness – significantly affect patenting before and 
after incorporation. Although some effect sizes slightly increase in the post-founding models, 
the  overall  change  of  these  influences  over  time  is  low.  The  finding  that  the  patenting 
rationale  of  academic  entrepreneurs  is  relatively  stable  within  a  three-year  period  around 
incorporation is consistent with findings by Jain et al. (2009) that scientists largely preserve 
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scope of our study, future research could examine whether and how these patenting rationales 
change in the long run. Our study provides a first step to bridging the divide between the two 
literatures on university and firm patenting, as we examine academic entrepreneurs transiting 
from the academic to the business world. 
 
5.3  Implications for practice 
This study also offers several practical implications. Several states have passed acts to 
stimulate  patenting  and  research  commercialization  at  publicly-funded  institutions.  Our 
results  show  that  after  the  passage  of  the  German  Employees’  Invention  Act,  academic 
entrepreneurs are less likely to patent inventions prior to incorporation. As an explanation, 
some prospective entrepreneurs might delay the patent application until after incorporation to 
prevent the threat of not receiving (exclusive) licenses. However, inspection of the data shows 
that this is not the case for the start-ups in our sample. They seem to prefer to avoid patenting 
at all in the aftermath of the act. This raises questions on whether such acts yield opposing 
effects and how policy-makers can align the interests of academic entrepreneurs and research 
organizations.  
The  results  for  the  relative,  temporal  stability  of  some  influences  could  motivate 
academic entrepreneurs to reflect upon their rationales for patenting. The start-up success 
may, in part, depend on the extent to which they adopt the “rules of the game” in the business 
world. Consequently, academic entrepreneurs should ensure that academic influences do not 
impede with firm interests in patenting start-up technology. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations
a 
   Variable  MW  SA  1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10     11    12     13    14     15    16     17   18   19    20 
1. Patents (t0)
b  .46 .50 -                                                                           
2. Patents (t1)  .25 .44 .63
*** -                                                                       
3. Num. of patents (ln, t0)  .71 .94 .82
*** .66
*** -                                                                   
4. Num. of patents (ln, t1)  .34 .67 .55
*** .87
*** .73
***  -                                                               




*** -                                                           




**  -.03   -                                                       
7. Field engineering  .931.31-.09  -.07  -.10  -.08  -.40
***-.18
**  -                                                   





***-.09  -.09   -                                               
9. Pace of techn. development  3.731.41 .13
*  .09  .14
*  .12
t  .09  .02  .01  -.04  -                                           




*** .08  -.03  .08  -.01   .01  -                                       
11. Patent effect. (techn. field)








***-.01  -.07   -                                   






*** -.07  -.25
*** .05  -.01  .44
*** -                              




*** .07  -.13
*  .13
*  -.02  .07  .10
t  -.03  .08   -                           
14. EIA





t  -.07  .15
*  .05  .00   -.20
** .09  .01   -.10  -                       
15. Institutional support
e  .22 .42 .10  .09  .13
*  .10  .06  -.08  .12
t  -.04  .19
**  .09  -.03  .05   .06   -.04  -                   
16. Team size  3.271.90 .06  .06  .10  .08  .24




*  -.10  -.15 
* .03   -.03  .10
t  -               
17. Number of R&D employees  .83 .24 .09  .02  .03  -.01  -.02  .06  .06  .00  -.04  .10  .13
*  .09   -.02  .26
*** .00  -.05  -           
18. Start-up experience
f  .37 .48-.02  -.08   -.02  -.11
t  -.02  .01  .04  .19
**  -.02  .03  -.09  -.09   .07   .05  .03  .23
*** .02 -        
19. Market potential  5.241.51 .03  .08  .08  .15
*  -.07  .02  .11
t  -.01  .18
** -.08  .03  .01   .16 
*  -.02  .04  -.02  .03 -.01 -     
20. Expert knowledge  5.071.39 .13
*  .10  .14
*  .12
t  .07  -.05  .10  -.02  -.08  .03  .07  .04   .24 
***-.01  .11
t  -.03  .02 -.03 .17
**- 
21. Venture capital





*  .08   -.08   -.05   .07   .02   .14
*  .10 
t  .17 
**  -.16
**  .19
** .07   -.04  .02 .12
*  .01
a n = 260. 
b t0 = pre-founding phase, t1 = post-founding phase; coding: 1 = at least one patent filed, 0 = else. 
c Coding: 1 = high effectiveness, 0 = else. 
d Coding: 1 = firm 
founded after EIA in 2001, 0 = else. 
e Coding: 1 = centralized patenting, 0 = else. 
f Coding: 1 = start-up experience, 0 = else. 
g Coding: 1 = at least one venture capitalist 
holds stakes in firm equity, 0 = else. 
t p < .10, 
* p < .05, 
** p < .01, 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed test). 
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Table 2: Regression Results of patent propensity prior to and after firm founding
a 
    Pre-founding phase    Post-founding phase 
    Patents
b   
Number of 
patents (ln)    Patents
b   
Number of 
patents (ln) 
      B    S.E. Exp(B)    b    S.E.     B    S.E. Exp(B)    b    S.E. 
  Field natural science    .47
**  .16  1.61   .25
**  .05    .50
*** .13 1.64   .31
***  .03 
  Field medicine    .59
*  .29  1.81   .14
*  .09    .81
**  .27 2.26   .17
**  .06 
  Field engineering    .24  .17  1.28   .10  .05    .16  .15 1.17   .06  .03 
  Field computer science    .31  .22  1.36   .10  .07    .08  .28 1.08   .03  .05 
  Pace of techn.development    .19
t  .11  1.21   .11
*  .04    .08  .12 1.08   .03  .03 
  Technological uncertainty    .23
*  .11  1.26   .11
*  .04    .45
*** .13 1.57   .18
***  .03 
  Patent effect. (techn. field)
c    1.71
***  .36  5.54   .36
***  .12                  
  Patent effect. (industry)                       .53
**  .19 1.70   .12
*  .04 
  Entrepreneurial orientation                       .11
t  .06 1.11   .14
*  .01 
                                       
  Employee's invention act (EIA)
d  -0.94
**  .32  .39   -.23
***  .11                  
  Centralized support
e    .42  .36  1.52   .10
t  .12                  
  Team size    -.11  .10  .90   -.04  .04                  
  R&D employees                       -.11  .73 .90   -.03  .15 
  Start-up experience
f    .06  .31  1.06   .01  .11    -.50  .37 .61   -.12
*  .08 
  Market potential                       .16  .13 1.17   .12
*  .02 
  Expert knowledge                       .07  .14 1.07   .03  .03 
  Venture capital
g                       .59  .41 1.81   .19
***  .09 
                                       
  Nagelkerke R
2    .34                  .36             
  Correct predictions (%)    72.70                  81.90             
   adj. R
2     
            0.28
                         0.28     
a n = 260. 
b Coding: 1 = at least one patent filed, 0 = else. 
c Coding: 1 = high effectiveness, 0 = else. 
d Coding:  1 
= firm founded after EIA in 2001, 0 = else. 
e Coding: 1 = centralized patenting, 0 = else. 
f Coding: 1 = start-up 
experience by at least one founder, 0 = else. 
g Coding: 1 = at least on venture capitalist holds stakes in firm 
equity, 0 = else. 
t p < .10, 
* p < .05, 
** p < .01, 
*** p < .001 (two-tailed test). 
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Appendix A – Items 
 
  Factor 
loading 
t-Value
Pace of technological development (α = .78, CR = .78, AVE = .48)   
Many companies conducted research within my company’s technology field.   .53  8.48
The number of companies conducting their own R&D in my company’s technology field 
was growing rapidly. 
.58  9.38
Many groups of researchers in public research institutions were active in my company’s 
technology field. 
.86  14.98
The  number  of  groups  of  researchers  in  public  institutions  conducting  research  in  my 
company’s technology field was growing rapidly. 
.76  12.98
   
Technological uncertainty (α =.77 , CR = .80, AVE = .60)   
It was easy to understand, which other technologies our company required besides our core 
technology to create marketable products (r). 
.41  6.72
The time to develop our core technology to marketability could be clearly estimated. (r)  .94  16.23
The costs to develop our core technology to marketability could be clearly estimated. (r)  .84  14.87
   
Innovativeness (α = .75, CR = .76, AVE = .62)   
Our company has introduced many new products or services over the past three years.  .70  8.89
Changes in products or service lines have usually been quite dramatic.  .87  10.08
   
Proactiveness (α = .64, CR = .70, AVE = .44)   
Our company undertakes great efforts to find new applications for our core technologies and 
to open new markets for our existing products/services.  
.65  9.89
Our  company  introduces  new  technologies  and  methods  for  the  production  of  our 
products/services long before our competitors do so. 
.62  9.46
My company typically waits until other companies introduce new products/services to the 
market before introducing new products/services. (r) 
.72  10.95
   
Risk-taking (α = .70, CR = .71, AVE = .55)   
Over the past three years, our company has engaged in very many high-risk projects with 
chances of very high returns. 
.73  7.76
Our company has emphasized taking bold, wide-ranging and capital-intensive actions in 
positions itself and its products/services over the past three years. 
.75  7.84
   
Market potential (α = .76, CR = .78, AVE = .65)   
The breadth of potential applications for the core technology was enormous.  .68  8.90
Applications for the core technology had enormous market potential.  .91  10.48
   
Expert knowledge (α = .71, CR = .77, AVE = .53)   
Members of the founding team were considerably involved in technological breakthroughs 
in my company’s technological field. 
.75  12.16
Knowledge about the operational principles of my company’s core technology was widely 
disseminated in the scientific community. (r) 
.68  11.05
Competitors were able to very quickly learn about the core technology from public sources 
(books, journals, internet, etc.) to the point of being able to implement it. (r) 
.74  12.00
r = reverse coded, α = Cronbach’s Alpha; CR = Composite Reliability; AVE = Average Variance Explained;
Model fit: χ
2/df = 1.59; GFI = .92; AGFI = .89, RMSEA = .05 
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Appendix B – Descriptive statistics for patent effectiveness 
 
Technological fields    Industries 
  n
1  Mean  s.d.      n
1  Mean  s.d. 
microelectronics  157  5.31  1.30    construction  168  4.71  1.51 
microsystems  147  5.44  1.22    chemicals  182  6.01  1.04 
molecular electronics  137  5.06  1.38    computers and office machines  175  3.97  1.59 
nanotechnology  153  5.48  1.26    electrical engineering  175  5.54  1.14 
new materials  166  5.84  1.10    energy  154  5.09  1.24 
photonics  136  5.24  1.27    optics and precision engineering  166  5.67  1.09 
prod. and management techniques  148  3.63  1.57    aviation  150  5.01  1.40 
software & systems  155  3.74  1.55    mechanical engineering  184  5.94  .99 
biotechnology  159  5.71  1.16    health care  190  5.99  .99 
          communications  160  5.03  1.25 
          pharmaceuticals  178  6.37  .89 
          automotive  161  5.58  1.28 
1 The respondents only evaluated their fields of expertise. 
 
 
 